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Abstract
The motivation for research into helicopter agility stems
from the realisation that marked improvements relative to
current operational types are possible, yet there is a dearth
of useful criteria for flying qualities at high performance
levels. Several research laboratories are currently investing
resources in developing second generation airborne
rotorcraft simulators. The UK's focus has been the
exploitation of agility through active control technology
(ACT); this paper reviews the results of studies conducted
to date. The conflict between safety and performance in
flight research is highlighted and the various forms of
safety net to protect against system failures are described.
The role of the safety pilot, and the use of actuator and
flight envelope limiting are discussed. It is argued that the
deep complextity of a research ACT system can only be
tamed through a requirement specification assembled using
design principles and cast in an operational simulation
form. Work along these lines conducted at DRA is
described, including the use of the Jackson System
Development method and associated Ada simulation.
Introduction
The central issue when setting requirements for in-flight
simulation involves the trade-off between performance and
safety. The integrity of the experiment, from the very
concept being tested through to its implementation in
software and hardware, determines the achievable flight
performance level. The greater the uncertainty in the
behaviour of the simulated aircraft, then the greater the risk
of misbehaviour; likewise, the lower the reliability of the
experimental system, then the greater the risk of failure and
consequent misbehaviour. It follows that the higher the
inherent performance of the aircraft and its experimental
system, the higher is the risk that misbehaviour will lead
to an accident. Operational constraints and regulations
usually dictate that this dilemma is resolved in favour of
safety, hence compromising performance, or making it
very expensive to achieve. These ideas are not new of
course, and have featured large in the aircraft systems field
for many years; the disciplines of modern design, test and
implementation methods now ensure a degree of confidence
in solutions to well defined problems. The compounding
dilemma is that research into new and improved flying
qualities contains the problem definition itself, and defining
the flying qualities boundaries requires gathering data with
Level 2 and 3 configurations.
The development of full authority, flight critical, active
control technology (ACT) for helicopters has been
proceeding apace for more than ten years with nine
experimental aircraft in the form of research and technology
demonstrators having flown in the western world. In the
search for the quantum change in helicopter flying quality,
a variety of solutions to the performance/safety tradeoff
have been employed, including constrained experimental
flight envelopes, multiple redundant hardware and limited
performance actuation systems. All experimental systems
have employed a Safety Pilot whose cockpit controls are
back-driven, providing the primary cue on the behaviour of
the system; experience has shown that the Safety Pilot is
the most critical safety element. Along with ground-based
simulators, these first generation variable-stability, active
control helicopters have been used extensively to explore
novel control methods and to build the database from which
the ADS33C flying qualities criteria have been developed
and substantiated.
Several Nations are now looking forward and planning the
development of second generation ACT helicopters with a
range of new research objectives in mind, centred on the
need for greater levels of automation;
i) to extend operations in degraded visual cue environments,
ii) through the provision of carefrce handling, enabling safe
exploitation of the full operational flight envelope (ORE),
iii) through the integration of flight with fire control,
engine control and mission systems to provide greater
concurrency and hence operational effectiveness.
Research into these aspects of helicopter ACT needs to
deliver _)lutions that will increase performance and safety
in harmony. Ironically, its noted above, when exploring a
new idea in flight, performance and safety attributes can
conflict, and there is a p_)tential problem that development
of ACT and its operational benefits will be hindered by this
dilemma. Recognition that a certain level of risk is
inevitable is the fir_ step towards resolving this problem;
establishing well h)rmulated operating procedures that
contain the risks during the exploration of new concepts is
the second. Adopting an approach to specification and
design, that tames the complexity of the integration of the
flight control system with the vehicle, its subsystems and
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the pilot, is the important third step in this process and
will feature as one of the ke5 themes of this paper.
The paper reviews the UK DRA (formerl) RAE)
programme to define the requirements for and to build a
high performance flight research system, designated ACT
Lynx. Taking the performance/safety tradeoff as a starting
l:x_int, a number of aspics are addressed.
1) The performance requirements and the driving
research objectives x_ill be outlined, the emphasis from the
outset has been to achtcve high agility at low pilot
workkxat.
2) The safety constraints and how the,,' reflect on
s,vstem architecture and airframe health will be addres_d.
The role of the safety pilot will be described and issues
surrounding inte_'ention times following failures will be
addressed, drawing on results from an exploratory' ground-
based simulation conducted at DRA. Experience with other
experimental ACT helicopters are discussed and (non-
attributed) examples of the kind of failures that safety
pilots have had to cope with in the past will be
highlighted.
3) A vital key to confidence that an experimental
flight control system will perform as required lies in the
development of the functional requirements as an integral
part of the system design. This has been achieved in the 6
ACT Lynx project by the incremental development of an
Ada simulation of the triplex redundant system using the HOR
Jackson System Development (JSD) mctht_lology. The
approach focusses attention on the interface of the 5
experimental system with the outside world, eg operations
at the pilot vehicle interface (PVI), the actuation system,
sensor system etc. The behaviour of the system is
considered from a constructional/design, rather than a 4
hierarchical/descriptive, viewpoint. This distinction is
crucial at an early stage to capture all the nuances of the
intended behaviour. In 'addition, many of the human factors
issues at the pilot/vehicle interface can be examined in 3
detail through simulation. This approach is described.
4) The mcthtxlology for control law design and
assessment is de._ribed. An important concern is the
validation of the behaviour of the implemented control law;
earl',' in its life it will be immature and made up of several,
limited flight-envelope, an-integrated functions. The
development towards continuous, full flight envelope,
agilit,, enhancing control functions involves a gradual
expansion of the envelope and actuator authority, using
ground based simulation to pave the way !k_r the flight
tests. The philosophy will be described, including the role
of the curtain limiter, a device for moderating the control
inputs to the experimental actuators.
The UK programme is currently at a hiatus due to funding
limitations, but sufficient ground has been covered to
provide mine clear messages for others striving for similar
goals. The UK continues to collalxsrate with the key
players in the research field - US Army/NASA, NRC and
DLR - and this paper presents the opportunity to stimulate
discussion, _ith the wider manufacturing and research
community, on some of the trade-offs in this important
ar_a.
Harmonising Safety and Performance
Research Objectives
A companion paper at this Conference (Ref I) has
highlighted situations ,ahere current operational helicopter'_
lack agility, such that when operated at high performance
le,,els, llying qualities deteriorate and lead to high piloting
workload. Figure 1 reflects this through the variation in
pilot handling qualities ratings (HQR) with Agility Factor
- the ratio of ideal task time to actual task time in a
mission task element _MTE). As the pilot increases
performance, the degradation from le,,el 1 to p,.x-_rlexel
2/level 3 ratings is rapid, making the use of high
performance potentially quite dangerous.
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The results shown in Figure I were gathered on the
research Lynx at DRA Bedford, l]own at much lighter
weights than in normal operational Service, to simulate the
higher perlk_rmance margins expected of future types; the
results are considered to be typical of all current Service
aircraft and indicate a clear goal Ior research into improved
flying qualities. A primary objective of ACT Lynx was
therefore aimed at demonstrating the achievement of Level
I/2 flying qualities at high agility factors as shown in Fig
I. This and other key research objectives are summarised
in question form as follows;
1)Canlevel1flyingqualitiesbeachievedathtghagility
factors?Researchtoanswerthisquestionwouldproducea
databasefromwhichcarefreehandlingfunctionscouldbe
definedandpotentialupperflyingqualitiesboundaries
identified.
2)Canmulti-axis idesticksbeusedeffectivelyin such
circumstancesandwhatlevelof automattonisrequiredto
facilitatetheiruse? This research would address the
crgonomic aspects of sidesticks and define the optimum
feel characteristics and sensitivities; it would also address
the use of such controllers with reversionary, less well
augmented, modes.
3) Can high performance be achieved in the presence of
strong disturbances'? Disturbance rejection and ride-control
functions can be designed to operate effectively at
co'nsiderably higher bandwidths than handling-control
functions and this research would define those control
functions and associated sensor requirements.
4) What are the critical control augmentation/display trade-
offs in degraded visual conditions? Research would address
the integration aspects of displays and response types for
different usable cue environments (UCE), blending issues
and identify critical parameters in the controls/displays
made-off.
5) How can ACT be exploited to enhance functional
integration between the flight control system and mission
systems eg fire, engine, navigation? This question would
direct research towards maximising concurrency between
the Flight and mission management systems, leading
ultimately to the potenti_ for fully automated flight.
Objectives I, 2 and 3 require the high-fidelity environment
of an in-flight simulator, able to operate in realistic
scenarios close to the visual-cue-rich environment of
natural terrain and cover, whereas considerable progress
towards Objectives 4 and 5 can be made with ground-_tsed
simulation. In addition, the displays and integration
research require considerably more on-board equipment.
Hence the initial fex:i of ACT Lynx were to be the three
high perlormance objectives.
Performance & Safety - The Conflict
The operational flight envelope for the Lynx Mk 7
represents the baseline ACT Lynx envelope. Key features
are given in Table 1. The high values _1 attitude quickness
and bandwidth stem from the hingeless rotor on the Lynx
with its 13'7, effective flap hinge offset. The rotor provides
a high natural damping and control moment capability
enabling higher levels of agility to be exploited than with
articulated rotor helicopters. Figure 2 illustrates the
envelopes of roll and pitch quickness achieved in the Lynx
for Sidestep and Quickhop re-_sitioning MTEs (Ref 2).
The envelope covers the full attitude range to illustrate the
high bandwidth (low amplitude) and control powers (high
amplitude) achieved cvcn in these, non-tracking, MTEs.
Table 1 ACT Lynx Performance Characteristics
Performance Lynx Mk 7 Flight Envelope
Aspect for ACT Lynx
hover thrust
margin
roll, pitch,
yaw control
[:K)wer
quickness lbr
10deg attitude
change
attitude
bandwidth
in hover
low speed
side velt_ity
envelope
krad lactor
Vm__x
> 20q (sea level, 20 deg C)
> 100deg/s, 6(kieg/s, 6(kteg/s
> 4 rad/s (roll), 2 rad/s (pitch)
> 5 rad/s (roll), 3 rad/s (pitch)
30 kn
>2g, Og
> 140 kn (sea level, 20 deg C)
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The quickness is a direct rneasure of agility, closely related
to the time to achieve an attitude change. At the two
amplitude extremes the achieved quickness values are well
above the ADS33C Level I requirements for bandwidth and
control power and there is a generous margin in the
moderate amplitude range, even relative to the tracking
MTE _xJundary. Combined with a mtnlerate hover thrust
margin, maximum 'g' capability and wide speed envelope,
these performance characteristics make Lynx well suited as
an ACT testbed. But the performance is only useful if
control laws are able to exploit fully the OFE and this
raises rundamental _fety issues concerning the aircraft
behaviour following ACT system failures.
S_stcm failure can be hx)sely classified under two
categories;
l) hardware failures; these are usually assumed to
be random in nature, hence only predictable in a statistical
sense, eg one failure expected within IOn operating hours.
The usual method of protecting against such failures is to
build in hardware redundancy together with comparatc)rs and
monitors, effectively to increase n.
ii) software failures; two ways that a software
implementation can 'fair' or misbehave follow from either
the correct programming of the wrong reaction or failure to
take certain situations into account. It is sometimes
claimed that the probability of a software error (_cunng can
be related statistically to the degree of testing carried out,
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but this does not appear to have a sound thet_rcucal
foundation. [n reality, I:x_th the al:x_ve soft,rare failures arc
deterministic and context dependent and unless the testing
happens to include the particular conditions, the error is
likely be missed.
The Safety Pilot
Failures in both categories can be expected to occur
throughout the life of an ACT research vchicle and give
rise to a ','anety of different beha', iour including fast,slo_
hardover, oscillatory or frozen actuator demands.
Acknowledging this, the next set of questions relate to the
integrity of the system, the related tolerance to failures and
the means of protection. All ACT research helicoptcrs
operated o','er the last ten years have included one principal
element in common in this regard - they ha_ e all had a
Safety Pilot, whose controls are back driven b', the
research actuators. The latter have either been special
purlx_se, dual mode (electro-mechanical) type (Refs 3, 4. 5)
or connected in parallel with existing power control units
(Refs 6, 7, 8). All types have been full authority, high
rate actuators. The safety pilot, with his backdriven
controls providing an immediate and instinctive cuc as to
the health of the system and the experiment, is generally
regarded as the most important and vital safet_ clement. A
well trained safety pilot will be able to idcntifx
misbehaviour through the motions of his backdrivcn
controls, and can take rapid action to presern e rlight sal'ct3.
However, very special skills are required to make a g_,_d
safety pilot, among which is the ability to judge _ hen, and
when not, to disengage and how to recover to a '_afe flight
condition. It is a very demanding role and an_ hctp that the
system can provide will reduce the workload and lessen the
risk of a loss of control.
Help can be provided in the rorrn of a fail-safe or fail-
operate system configuration. Fail-:',_'e normally relies on
a monitor system running concurrently' with the flight
control system, either sampling and comparing dual
channels or comparing the signals in a single lane with
that from a mtnlel. If the comparator detects a difference,
outside a defined threshold, the system will be tripped out
and control will be returned to the safety pilot with
appropriate 'alert signals. Fail-operate signifies that the
system can continue operation Ik)llowing one or more
failure; through monitoring and _oting, faults can be
detected and isolated. The remaining healthy system
coml:xments continue to function as normal, but the crew
is alcrted to the fauh. For a single fail-operate s}stcm, the
system degrade s to fail-safe following a [allure.
Operational fly-by-wire fixed wing aircraft are normall,,
designed with a two fail-safe capability with respect to
hardware failures to achieve the necessary o',erall %vstem
integrity. This requires a triplex-monitored or quadraplex
system architecture. The re,arch helicopters operated over
the last ten years have a ,,ariel,," of different solutions
implemented. The NRC's Bell 205 (Ref 3) and DLR's
BOI05 (Ref 6) are both single string systems with a
limited fail-safe capability centred on the rly-by-wire
actuator input/output relationship. Rotor flapping is
monitored in the 205 and hub moment in the 105 _ith
lyoth having limits which, if exceeded, tnps the systems
out. The ADOCS demonstrator (Ref 4) included a triplex
fly-by-light hardware configuration and an independent
(analogue) monitor. The latter was designed to m(xtel the
behaviour of the primary flight control system (PFCS),
hence automatic flight control system (AFCS) inputs were
signalled as errors bv the comparator; the thresholds were
set to allo_ m¢_lerately aggressive flying. This, so-called
DOCS monitor, was designed to catch soft,rare and other
common mode 'failures'. The AV05 research aircraft (Ref
8) comprised a dual-duplex architecture providing, in
principal, a tv,o-fail operate capabilit}. The concept
included flight cnvelope limiting features within the
control system. Most of these aircraft also featured a trip
when the engine/rotor system torque exceeded a prescribed
al ue.
From this very brief review of some of the current designs
it is clear that help can be provided to the safety pilot in a
multitude of ways; it is also clear that current wisdom
suggests that he does need help, particularly in the
detection of rapid, potentially rotor damaging, control
inputs. The dilemma comes from trying to distinguish
between a system failure and a genuine ACT system
command; both can hx_k very simdar at the actuation
stage. Failures from hardware faults can be detected and
isol.ated through fail-safe or fail-operate architectures;
software failures are considerably more difficult to detect.
As noted above, software errors in both the categories
discussed aLxwe are likely to be a regular (x:curance in the
development of a control la_v. Examples (non-attributed)
of software failures that have occured on ACT helicopters
include, iOO,/. */e HEIGHT LOf_ (OF INITIAL
HEIGHT)
MAX; 90°1o 163FT
SO !_
O, , , I I, I. ; ; i ;"1
O 20 40 60 !10 IOO
FEET
1) 3-axis hardover caused by di_ ide by zero - excursions ,,l
20 deg pitch, 35 deg roll and 20 ft height loss during
recover',
2) control me,des not referencing to correct flight condition,
leading to position error and roll into turn,
3) integrators not inhibited at control stops, leading to time
delay in response to following input,
4) no priority given when engage/discngage pressed
simultaneously
All led to a transfer of control to the safety pilot, ahhough
there was inevitably some delay in recover3 due to failure
recognition problems. It should be stressed that no
accidents have occured on ACT research helicopters to date.
Safety Pilot Simulation
To gain a better understanding of the kind of beha_ tour that
Lynx would exhibit in response to failures and the
resulting safety pilot reaction, an exploratory simulation
trial was carried out on the Advanced Flight Simulator at
DRA (Ref 9), using the small motion system. A Lynx,
augmented with an ACT system, providing Level I t13ing
qualities, was flown through a range of mis_i_m task
elements. The safety pilot occupied the cockpit on the
motion base, with the 'evaluation' pilot II_ing from the
control desk.
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Hardover failures were injected in combinations of axes at
various points during the flying, and the safety pilot's task
was to disengage the ACT system and recover the aircraft
without exceeding limits and, of course, avoid the ground
and obstacles. Following disengage, the aircraft
configuration was Lynx with limited authority stability
augmentation, as envisaged for ACT Lynx. This initial
investigation had several related objectives including an
evaluation of alternate disengage and alert met;hanisms. A
total of 61 failure events were flown with three evaluation
pilots. With the preferred 'force' disconnect system, all
disconnects were achieved in less than 0.3 second; 'button'
disconnects resulted in longer times, up to 1 second.
Figure 3 shows a statistical summary of the peak values of
critical aircraft states recorded during recovery" relative to the
flight envelope limitations, including the height loss. The
3g peak occurred following a right cyclic/pedal runaway in
a right turn, when a height loss of 63 feet was also
recorded. The load factor limit was exceeded on this
occasion to avoid hitting the ground. The main rotor
torque and rotorspeed limits were both exceeded once, the
former following a sympathetic positive collective failure
in a bob-up. The results of the work reported in Reference
9 are tentative. The AFS simulation cues were limited and
the Lynx aircraft mcudel has known deficiencies particularly
in the off-axis responses and in hard turns. Also. worst
cases may not have been evaluated and instinctive, trigger
di_ngage mechanisms were not evaluated. Nevertheless,
the potential for very rapid flight envelope exceedances
during failures, when operating close to limits, was
demonstrated and the dangers of vertical flight-path
excursions during recovery were highlighted.
Protection Devices
Protection against such occurrances needs to take into
account that responses to failures can be similar to the
response to an aggrcssivc ,.L, ;eho_-,nr,ut applied to maximise
agility. An appro_'h used in the past has been to restrict
the inputs to the rotor through employing both limited
authority series actuators (as normally' found in a
conventional SCAS) and parallel actuators with reduced
rates. Figure 4 illustrates the roll kinematics and pilot's
lateral cyclic command during a sidestep manoeuvre on a
phase plane. The sh',uled areas correspond to the excluded
region if series/parallel, frequency-splitting, actuation had
been used with typical 20% (20%/s) authority. The
mant_uvre would havc becn severcly compromised. Fig 5
illustrates the control/actuation quickness or 'attack' tbr the
Lynx sidcstcps showing valucs up to the PFCU bandwidth
of 15 rad/s at small amplitude and quite high values
extending out to large control inputs. The superimposed
lines correspond to boundaries Set by different actuation
rates. The Lynx actuation system is able to achieve values
greater than 200%.see in single lanes. Any actuation rate
limiting below this would clcarly dcprivc the pilot of
performance, but no systematic investigation of this aspect
was carried out. Actuation limiting in such a crude manner
can be effective but needs to be implemented in software if
the limits are to be extended as confidence grows in the
behaviour of a control law. This is effectively what
happens with ADOCS, although in that implcmcntation
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(Ref 4) the DOCS monitor tripped the ACT system out if
rates and amplitudes from the Arcs were t_ high. For
ACT Lynx, a scheme based on this approach was
suggested, illustrated conceptually in Fig 6. The so-called
'Curtain Functions' would be defined in the soft,rare that
limited the actuator inputs as shown in Fig 6. Initially,
for a new control law, the curtain would be well closed,
offering maximum protection following failures. As the
control law developed and confidence grew in its behaviour,
the curtains would be opened incrementally, until full
performance was available. The concept has yet to be
evaluated in simulation but potentially offers a sale route
through to high agility.
As noted earlier, the ACT helicopters that have been
operated over the last 10 years have adopted many different
approaches to this protection question. It is believed that
three main factors contribute to the 100c_ safety record in
the operation of research ACT helicopters.
a) the reliance on an experienced, well trained and highly
skilled safety pilot
b) the adoption of operating procedures that emphasise
flight safety
c) the use of flight envelope monitors or restrictions that
inhibit agility, particularly in low level trials.
For ACT Lynx, it was always considered that the practices
in categories a) and b) developed by organisations like
DLR, NRC and NASA would be fully adopted. The focus
on agility research, however, meant that issues assCx:iated
with c) had to be faced squarely and an alternate strategy
developed that enabled a way lbtnvard. A fail-operate/fail
safe (FOFS) architecture was sclected to provide full
protection against hardware failures, with the argument that
in ._afcty critical :situations, c;'cn thc :_alcty pilot may not
have sufficient time to recover with only a fail-safe system.
Methcxtoiogies that ensure comprehensive verification and
validation of the software system elements would be
vigorously pursued. It was recognised that there would be
two components to the embedded software, a high integrity
'core', including consolidation, monitoring, voting and
actuator drive functions that would remain essentially fixed
during the development of a contro! law. and the control
law itself and its attendant curtain function, that would
regularly change in structure and data input. The control
law was envisaged as the most appropriate place lot the
envelope limiting to bc incorl:xwatcd, in thc form of
carefree handling functions. Ultimately, the control law
would need to function without independent t_onitoring, to
enable the high agility testing to be realised. For both
kinds of mftwarc it was considered that a high investment
in the requirements capture and definition process would
pay off in high system integrity; these issues arc dcvcl_3pcd
further in later sections.
Airframe Fatigue Usage
Before discussing these aspects, there is one additional
consideration regarding :'sat'crythat was addressed with ACT
Lynx - thequestionof the impactof ACTflying on
airframefatigue.It wasalwaysrecognisedthatanagility
researchaircraftwouldspenda greater proportion of flight
time in high fatigue-usage manoeuvres, than its operational
counterparts. Also, the effects of the ACT control
functions on control linkage and rotor loads was relatively
unknown. A third issue stemmed from the recognition that
the existing aircraft's OFE was defined with a margin
relative to the safe flight envelope and that carefree
handling functions would, in principle, allow some of this
additional performance to be used with safety. Some form
of load monitoring in this regime would be essential. The
critical structural areas were identified by the manufacturer
and comprised components on the main/tail rotor hub and
blades, control links, fuselage frame and gearbox, tail cone
and fin. These components have since been strain-gauged
for non-ACT purposes and are undergoing in-flight
calibrations at the time of writing. The data from the
strain gauges are processed in two different ways. First,
via a telemetry link to a ground station to cnablc rcal-timc
monitoring of loads and, second, to the on-board recorder
system for post-flight analysis and fatigue usage
calculations. From a safety standpoint, the fatigue usage
monitoring task was seen as an integral part of the
comprehensive approach taken with the ACT L)nx
concept.
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comprehensive requirement specification _ a.s needed I-or the
total system, de_cloped through simulation, that defined
the range of interacting functions and their t_peraut_ns.
Requirement Specification & Incremental
Simulation
Preliminary Design Evaluation
The ACT Lynx design concept evolved from a numbcr of
prelimina_' studies which carefully c:_plorcd _hc fca'.;ibili,'3
of modifying the DRA Research Lynx into a variable
stability, active control, research helicopter.
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Fig 6 Actuator Phase Plane Portrait with
Curtain Function
As a bonus, much valuable data on the different airframe
load spectra cxperienccd with the ACT system would be
gathered and, ultimately, the load measurements would be
available to the ACT system itself in the pursuit of
envelope-expanding carefree handling functions.
In summary, the achievement of high performance with
ACT Lynx was to be enabled through the incorporation of
several layers of 'safety net'. The hardware would be
designed to cxhibit fail-operate/fail safe reliability. The
Tixed' software would be designed and tested to be fault
free. The control law software would operate within thc
constraints c_l"the actuator curtain and be developed to a
fault free state Ik)r testing in flight critical regimes. The
safety pilot would be the ultimate protection against
damaging Ilight path excursions and limit exceedances.
Fatigue monitoring and accounting would protect against
the consequences on airframe health of unconventional
manoeuvres and control activity and provide a check for
greater than usual fatigue life consumption. Thcsc _l'ety
nets were autonomous by design, yet it was recogni_d that
only through their proper integration into the ACT Lynx
concept would the performance targets be achievable. A
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Practic',.d issues addressed in these initial studies included a
confirmation that the installed power and actuator ,%vstem
were sufficient to test to the limits of the desired ACT
Lynx flight envelope, and that the mechanical linkages
could be m_.lified to allow backdriving by a set _1 high
performance parallel actuators. Additional cquipmcnt such
as sidestick controllers and ",ulvanced sen.,a_rs were specit led
and an outline of the system architecture proposed in terms
of a triplex flight control computer and a dual duplex
actuator drive and monitoring unit. An entirely triplex
architecture would have _tisfied the fail-operate/fail-safe
ORIG|i'_AL " 'c'_
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requtrement but, in the case of the ACT Lynx, a final
component having a dual duplex arrangement was deemed
to be more appropriate to connect harmoniously with the
duplex hydraulic systems and primary flight control units
(PFCUs). The ACT Lynx concept is illustrated in Figure
7.
A further aspect that received some preliminary design
consideration was the nature of the pilot interface - that is,
the displays, switches, buttons etc, that the pilot would
require in order to engage and operate the facilities of the
new system. These items were analysed and their likely
functionality and appearance described in outline. When, in
the light of these preliminary studies, the prospects for the
ACT Lyn x project seemed favourable, attention turned to
developing a high quality specification (Refs 10, I 1).
Specification Structure
In the design team there was a genuine commitment to
avoid the pitfalls of many other projects and leave nothing
to chance in the specification of the new system. In
particular, there was a determination that the requirements
specification must solve all of the significant design
issues. That is, it must be correct, it must be complete,
and it must be validated.
Such considerations placed a considerable challenge upon
the team in the preparation of the requirements
specification since there had to be sufficient detail to be
totally unambiguous; that is, the implementation had to be
clear, while at the same time there had to remain a high
level of visibility of the design concepts and what the
system was trying to do and why. These requirements are
often incompatible since the very accumulation of a morass
of detail imparts a complexity that militates against
understanding. It is such complexity which needed to be
tamed by an appropriate design and specification methcxl,
and which led to the decision to use m_xlern software design
methods for application to the whole diverse system. It
was also recognised that hierarchically organised
descriptions could be an effective technique for rcducing
complexity and in this case a decomposition of the system
into its major functional elements seemed to be the most
natural. This decomposition was the only one that was
imposed on the system a priori. The outcome is shown in
Figure 8, where the square and rectangular com_ments are
those relevant to the specification exercise. The bold
rectangles are referred to as processing elements to be
embodied in a Flight Control Computer (FCC), although
such terminology was not used in the written specification.
The elements of the system are described in the order of the
primary flow of the signal inlbrmation as illustrated by the
arrows in Fig 8.
(i) Sensor Element (SE). This leading element contains
the aircraft motion sensors - attitude and rate gyros and
accelerometers, and also the air data units for obtaining
velocity components, pressure and temperature
information.
(ii) Crew Station Element (CSE). The other leading
clement incorporates the conventional controls for the
safety pilot and a versatile sidestick controller facility for
the evaluation pilot. For convenience these inceptor
components were grouped together as an Inceptor Element
(,IE). The CSE also contains the various interfaces for the
pilot to engage, operate and be cued by the ACT s,, stem as
follows:
(a) Pilots Control Panel (PCP) - used by the
Evaluation Pilot for engagement and disengagement
and also for conducting the system-test sequence.
Engage and Disengage operations would normally be
pcrf_wmcd using switches on the pik_t's controls.
(b) Repeater Panel (RP) - provides a copy of the
displays for the Safety Pilot.
(c) Menu Panel (MP) - provides other ACT
interactions, such as selecting one of the available
control laws and sets of parameter values. The same
panel provides the interface for injecting
preprogrammed disturbances into the system, as part of
a flight-test facility used, for example, in gathering
data for the validation of the helicopter simulation
models and in demonstrating compliance with flying
qualities requirements ,,;f new control laws.
(d) Mcxte Select Panel (MSP) - available Ibr in-flight
selection of control modes, lbr example, height-hold,
speed-hold, hover hold.
(iii) Control Law Input Support Element (CLISE). This
element has the main purtx_e of processing and managing
the information from the Crew Station and Sensor
Elements. It also contains the function for scheduling of a
comprehensive system test.
(iv) Control Law Element (CLE). This element is
supplied with inceptor, sensor, mode selection and related
information by the CLISE. The CLE is the raison d'etre of
the ACT Lynx since it hosts the experimental control laws
which are to be evaluated. It is this element that the user
of the ACT Lynx, the flying qualities engineer, will
interact with. Carefully verified and validated control law
software will be plugged into and unplugged from this
element. Typically, six control laws will be selectable by
the experimental pilot with an additional choice of up to
six sets of parameters within each law.
(v) Control Law Output Support Element (CLOSE). The
clemefit following the CLE interfaces the demands pr_xluced
to the remainder of the system. It also provides a
selectable limiter on the demands produced by the control
law as additional protection against immature software.
(vi) Actuator Drive and Monitoring Element (ADME).
The final element to provide pr¢x:essing takes the demands
from the CLOSE and pr¢_Juces drive signals for the parallel
actuators resident in the Actuator Element, and the series
actuators in the PFCU. The ADME also manages the
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Fig 8 The ACT Lynx
engagement of the ACT system through the energising of
the parallel actuators, and supplies a normal
autostabilisation function when the ACT system is not
engaged.
(vii) Actuator Element. The par',dlel actuator system is last
in the sequence. The parallel actuators are connected to the
conventional control runs from the safety pilot; when thc
actuators are engaged (hydraulically powered), the controls
are back driven to provide the safety pilot with essential
control position cues and to aid in recoveries, and forward
driven to the Lynx PFCUs.
(viii) Extcrnal System Support Element (ESSE). In
supl_;rt t,f the above network of elements is an element
which essentially provides a catchment for all of the
significant data in the system. It interfaces with the on-
board data acquisition system and also with the
experimental helmet mounted or head down displays. A
record of all 3ystcm related events such as cngagcmcnt,
disengagement and diagnostic messages is retained in a
System Journal.
The specification takes each of the elements identified
al:xwe and provides a detailed description. Each element is
described in detail under the headings Type, Function,
Operation, Performance, Inputs & outputs, Interfaces,
Testing and Failure reporting & recovery. Where a
Logical Elements
particular element is composed of replicated units, so that
several units together comprise an element, the
replication of units in the element is stated and the unit
itself is described under the same headings. For example,
the CLISE is a triplex element composed of three identical
CLISUs (Control Law Input Support Units).
In the event, this pnmaD decompositi_on harmonised with
the subsequently developed techniques for coping with the
system's complexity. Hierarchies can lose their
simplifying property if the structures become too deep; lor
the ACT Lynx project only three levels were employed,
w'ith quite different specification techniques and associated
ttx_ls at each level:
(i) The top level is the written, structured text. [t is
manipulated and maintained by commercial text pr(x:essing
mfftware.
(ii) The middle lcvcl is the capture of the specification in a
Jackson System Development (JSD - Refs 12, 13) design,
using CASE t(_ls such as Speedbuilder (Refs 14, 15_.
(iii) The lowest level is the Ada codc. It is gcncratcd
automatically from the JSD design using a CASE t_l
such as Adacode, and is acted on by a conventional
compiler. The _;imulation so pr_xluced is an ideal vehicle
for validation of the specification.
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Thus each level has its own formalism and there is no
decomposition from one level to another. The first
consideration, as in many design problems, is deciding
where to start: one advantage of the Jackson JSD approach
is that the starting point is well defined: one must use the
narrative text of the specification to begin the modelling
phase.
Jackson System Development
Jackson System Development is a method of analysing a
written specification for a computer system to produce a
formally executable specification. The methcxi was jointly
developed by Michael Jackson and John Cameron in the
early 1980s (Refs 12, 13). It consists of three stages:
modelling, network and implementation. There is
considerable emphasis placed on the modelling stage in
order to establish, unequivocally, the information available
from the world outside the system being designed, with
which the system interacts.
Modelling and Entities: A model, in JSD, is a
description of the real world as it appears to the system.
Entities are objects in the real world which have to be
modelled by the system, and of particular interest in the
modelling activity are those entities which pertorm discrete
actions. For example, a press of the ARM button by the
evaluation pilot is an action to which the system must
respond. The modelling phase requires that the actions bc
allocated to specific entities, and the main task is to
identify viable entities and allocate the relevant actions to
them. For each entity, the time ordering of the actions
must be then be specified and, conventionally, a tree
diagram is used for this purlx)se. As an example, consider
the truncated list of actions from the ACT Lynx system
shown in Figure 9. Some of these are related to the pilot
entity in his role of engaging the ACT System; they may
be identified and their time-ordering expressed as a tree
diagram using Jackson Structured Programming (JSP)
notation (Ref 13). The diagram is shown in Figure 10
where the root is named 'after the entity which performs the
actions, and the leaves (.the lowest level Ix)xes which are
named rather than numbered) hold the names of the
individual actions. The intermediate nodes or boxes
describe the possible types of behaviour: sequence,
selection (o) and iteration (*), as denoted by the symtx)l in
the top right hand comer of the tx_x. The numbers in the
lowest level boxes refer to changes in the state of the
object (entity) as shown in the table in Figure lO.
Thus Figure 10 expresses a model of the Pilot Engagement
cntity as a repctition of ex:currences of Engagement Cycles.
An Engagement Cycle can either be a Normal Cycle,
composed of a sequence of Arm, Armed, Engage,
Di_ngage, or alternatively an "Early Disengage, compos, ed
of only part of the normal sequence followed by a
Di_ngage. The appropriate changes of state are indicated
by the numbered opcrations for each action, and it can be
seen that, prior to any action, the cngagement sta!.e is
initialled to DISENGAGED by operation 13.
Action Sumrna.ry : _;r:_,u,'es
APd,,t The punt requests u_at:he system
armed.
The _r,._ator _mons _ 'be
control law demands are m harmony
ID: >lODE_: D_T':" FE
ARMED
ARM_DEFA b'LT__IODE
CANCEL_SYSTE,M,
_TEST
CAEU_
COMPLETED_SYSTE.M
_TEST
COnTINUE_SYSTEM
_TEST
DISENGAGE
DOWN_DISTURBANCE
_R.EQU'EST
ENGAGE
FAI L_T E.ST _STAG E
The _m_tal a.,'mlng of a _et'auit
control mode.
A request co ¢._cei _e S3'scem :esL
T,"us _sthe signal _ mode _o go
FromAt_ _o A,___,AN'D_[N_C.-kP'
ALl tes_ of _e system c_:$t have
been sueeessfuly completed
[ndlcaaon thatt_e current testo( ',be
system testhas been successfully
completed.
The system nas"_en <lisengaged.
This may happen before
engagement (I) by the pilot pressing
the dlsengage button or (2) by ,he
s'y.stem failing co get into the
AR.M:ED or _N'GAGED State.
It may happen whilst ENGAGED
on receipt of a signal rrom an
actuator retaymg the fact that it has
become disengaged
The print wtshes to I:_ olferexi the
p_vlous valid disturbance. :./'tat t$
the first disrarbance with a lower
Lndex number ([D)
This is equivalent to the pilot
presssin_ tee DOWN burton
The ptLot requests (successtuily)
chat the system be en_a_ed.
The current 'automatic' stage of the
system _¢-st has not been
successfully completed.
[D: ' • "-v C
_v,GDE_,D_. , P-
Fig 9 Typical List of Actions
[ Pilot [
J
, '7
A_i Ii .krmed )I
0[:_ f"_tlOflS:
L0. SV SY ST E.'_d S'I'A T E. -- ARM[ NG.
t I. SV SYS'I'EM STATE:=ARMED:
[2. SV SYSTEM S'TATE; :F.NGAGED;
t3, $V SY El" F-M_-STA T'_ = Ol S _XlG A G ED:
Fig IO Pilot Engagement Cycle in JSP Form
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The same type of modelling is applied to the other
coml:xments of the CSE such as the activities associated
with the Menu Panel and the Mode Control Panel, to
obtain the full complement of model descriptions. In a
completed modelling exercise, the total set of tree diagrams
describes all of the time orderings of the actions plus the
changes in system state. In re'd-time systems it is often
only the acti;'itics at the man-machine interface which
require this type of modelling and much of the real world is
mtxlelled simply by I:x_lling sensor information. In the
ACT Lynx application, for example, the Lynx helicopter is
mtxielled kinemati_lly by polling data from inertial and air
motion sensors. The tree diagrams in these cases are
simply iterations of polling actions. The inceptor
displacements are conveniently treated in this manner too.
[t is fundamental to the JSD method that the model
structure in Figure 10 can be used as a program structure
for a process to control the engagement of the ACT
system. Once operations have been added to read incoming
action-messages then all that is required is for the
operations to be expressed in the required language° The
iterations can be expressed as loops and the selections as
conditional statements with appropriate conditions. The
result is that the tree diagram can be converted to code
mechanically either by.hand or, as in the current work,
automatically.
Network and Implementation Following on from
the modelling stage is the development of the network.
Pr_x:esses derived from the entities defined in the modelling
stage are called model processes. Other processes are
needed to make use of the data stored by the model
processes in order to generate the outputs which provide the
required functionality of the system. More details can be
found in Reference 1 I.
JSD Summary The principal aim of the JSD method is
to create a specification which can be usefully viewed from
both aLxyve and below. The mc, delling stage is an object
oriented analysis of the real world which produces a
description which users can readily grasp, because the result
is described in terms o1"objeclks familiar to the user. The
tree diagrams of the method ',also provide important detail
al:x)ut the model of the rcal world. The network stage uses
two descriptions: (a) Data flows, which can be presented to
the user to indicate the architecture of the system and (b)
Tree diagrams, which the analyst can use to express the
design of a particular function. The resulting specification
can be viewed by the user from above in terms of the
interface with the real world and, simultaneously, the
specification contains enough detail for the implementers
below to perlbrm their task. It is this general property that
makes JSD particularly attractive and encouraged a
determined assault on the difficulties associated with the
application of JSD to the complete ACT Lynx System.
Specification Structure
Even with the brief review of the JSD method Contained
atxwe, it should be clear that the envisaged application to
the ACT Lynx presented substantial technical challenges.
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The primary difficulty was how to adapt the methtx.l to a
system which had a diversity of types of component. For
example, how was a hydraulic actuator to be specified
using JSD and. in this context, what was the interpretation
of data streams and state vector inspections - the JSD inter-
process communication methods? A further compltcatmn
was how to include the replication associated with the
embedded redundancy without the occurrence of a
comensurate increase in complexity'. It was clear that the
JSD method itself, although offering a desirable
development route, did not, on its own, offer the reduction
of complexity which was considered essential for the ACT
Lynx requirements specification. As a compositional
method, JSD eschews a top-down approach to system
development. The rationale is argued at length by its
proponents and a convincing ease can be made for it in
softv,are development; however for more general systems,
the physical architecture can impose a natural
decomposition. This decomposition may then be harnessed
and used to guide the development of those enhanecmcnts
to JSD which are necessary, to reduce the complexity of the
system specification. This recourse to a decomposition
based on the underlying hardware was adopted for the ACT
Lynx system and led directly to a significant conceptual and
practical reduction in the descripti_ e complexity.
JSD enhancements The next step in resolving the
complexity of the system is to recognise that each
identifiable element can be viewed as an independent
system communicating in a limited way _ith other
elements. For elements which are composed of replicated
units, each unit is treated as independent.
,T
CLISU _ CLU _ CLOSU
Fig 11 Top Down View of Control Law Unit
Figure 11 shows an example of such a top down vie,v.
The data.stream into the CLU is a frame time-grain-markcr,
and the only inter'unit connections arc state vector
inspections. Each box represents a unit and JSD is applicd
in a conventional manner to that unit. The limitation of
inter-unit communication to state vector inspections is
crucial to the exploitation of the decomposition into
elements. The absence of data-stream connections means
that there are no inter-unit messages and consequentl) there
isnorequirementtodesigncomplexprocessstructuresto
handletheincomingandoutgoingmessageg.Therefore,
thecomplexityofaunitisdeterminedsolelybyitsintern.,d
functionalityand,moreover,theeffectsgf'anyredesignhas
limited impact on the rest of the system. The
simplification which results from this is so significant that
it justifies additional terminology, and the term JSD unit
has been adopted.
The problem of the diversity of the system is resolved by
transferring the specification to the software context. For
those aspects of the system which are not expected to be
digital, such as the actuator element, a simulation of that
clement is specified using the methods described above.
Naturally, care has to taken to ensure that all of the
relevant functional properties of the real element are
included in the simulation specification with due
authenticity. The integrity of replacing the real element in
a specification by a simulation depends not only on an
authentic duplication of its relevant [unctions, but also on
ensuring that the remainder of the system only has access
to that data which the real system can provide. In the case
of the actuator element, for example, the actuator positions
are not directly available to the ADMUs; one of the four
simulated position pick-off signals for each control lane
which must be used. Another example is the engagement
state of the actuator; signals corresponding to appropriate
_nsors mounted on the actuator must be used to determine .
whether the actuator is hydraulically energised or not. As a
consequence, the actuator entity must be modelled within
the ADMU using JSD principles. The need for modelling
one element within another is a natural consequence of the
imposed decomposition into elements (Ref 16).
When system elements consist of replicated units, for
example triplex or dual duplex, it is clearly undesirable to
compose a JSD network diagram lot each untt individually.
At best, it duplicates effort, and at _orst intr_duces errors
caused by accidental differences in the indi_ idual nct_ orks.
What is needed is to reflect the written specification and to
describe a single Unit in detail through a network diagram
in the normal manner, supplemented by a formal
description of the element in terms of its component units.
Such a formal de_ription is shown in Figure 12 (a) and (b)
which depict descriptions of units of the Inceptor and
Control Law Elements respectively as held on the CASE
database. After some standard information (STD-INFO),
consisting of its identifier and optional background detail,
the MAIN-PART of the description includes a number of
options such as:
(i) the type of unit - whether the unit is analogue or digital.
(ii) the number of units - here lyoth are simplex units
replicated three times.
(iii) Whether the units run synchronously or not.
To complete the description a list is required of all the JSD
processes which belong to that unit, and thus nccd to be
replicated; the final entry (UNIT-SID), being blank, shows
that the name of the list on the database dcfault:_ to the
name of the unit.
A similar format is provided for the description of the
connections between elements as shown by the example in
Figure 12 (c). The relevant fields arc the source.
destination and whether the connection is unit to unit
individually (ONE-TO-ONE), or completely cross
connected (BROADCAST). The connection description
also holds some information relating to the fault tolerance
implementation.
UNIT IE
STD-INFO
LONGNAME
REFERENCE IE
[']CLASSIFICATION-SET
[']SUMMARY
This unit is connected to the
inceptors of the evaluation
pilot.
[o]NARRATIVE
NO
MAIN-PART
[oITYPE
ANALOGUE
[o]BASE-REDUNDANCY
SIMPLEX
REPLICATION3
[o]UNIT.LVL-SYNCHRONISATION
ASYNCHRONOUS
FRAME-LAG
[']INTRA-UNIT-CONNECTIONS
UNIT-SIO
(a) unit description
(analogue)
Fig 12
UNIT CLE
STD-INFO
LONGNAME
REFERENCE CLE
[*]CLASSIFICATION-S ET
[']SUMMARY
This unit houses the control
law algorithm and associated
processing, (t is the middle processor
in a three processor "lane".
[o]NARRATtVE
NO
MAIN-PART
[o]TYPE
OIGITAL
[o]SASE-REDUNOANCY
SIMPLEX
REPLICATION 3
[o]UNIT-LVL-S YNCHRONISATION
ASYNCHRONOUS
FRAME-LAG 10
[']INTRA-UNIT-CONNECTIONS
UNIT-SID
(b) unit description
(digital)
CASE Database Formal Descriptions
CONNECTION IE_CLISE
STD-INFO
LONGNAME
REFERENCE IECLtS
[*]CLAS SIFICATION-SET
[']SUMMARY
[olNARRATIVE
NO
MAIN-PART
SOURCE IE
OESTINATIONCLISE
[o]OATA-TRANSMISSION
8ROAOCAST
[o]SPEC-INTERFACE
NO
[oICONSOLIDATION
YES
HISTORY_LENGTN3
[o]SIBLING_ERROR_MONITORING
YES
HISTORYLENGTH 3
(c) connection description
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Incremental Implementation
The compositional, or "middle out", nature of the JSD
method has the property that once a model has been built,
ever)" new function added to it provides a, potentially
deliverable, working system. In fact, at any stage of the
development of the network, it can be implemented.
Incremental development takes advantage of this natural
property of JSD and phases development of a system over a
number of increments. The added functionality required
from each increment is defined initially in outline and, as
each increment is completed, it is reviewed and the contents
of future increments re-examined in the Iight of any
modifications or additions that have been found to be
neces_ry. The development of a system is thus responsive
to an evolving specification but at the same time allows
the project to be managed on the basis of milestones
actually achieved.
The ACT Lynx simulation was developed over six
increments distributed as follows:
Increment 1: A model of the pilot/system
interaction including engagement of the ACT
system and inceptor movement, the Repeater
Panel and a display of the control run position.
Increment 2: A model of the pilot/system
interaction as regards System Test, Control Law
Selection, Disturbance Selection, Mode Selection,
Parameter Set Selection, the Menu Panel, Mode
Control Panel and Pilot's Control Panel.
Increment 3: A definition _ffa hardware de,_ription
language for units and connections, and
development of as,_'xziated tools. The functionality
of lnc_menls I and 2 is based on the specified
hardware, including fault tolerance. Provision for
injection of errors.
Increment 4: Completion of the Control Law
Input Support Element, including the
development of a t_x_l Ibr building a System Test
process from a non-procedural definition. The
Aircraft Motion Sensor and the Air Data Elements
Increment 5: Completion of the Control Law
Element and the Control Law Ouput Support
Element.
Increment 6: Completion of the Actuator Drive
ai_d Monitoring Element and the Actuator
Element. Further development of the System
Test Builder.
The simulation also includes a simple model of a Lynx
helicopter to provide sensor data and the actuator
displacements.
From the distribution of material in the six increments it
can be seen that the primary concern was to establish an
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acceptable model of the pilot's interface. One of the earl,,
lessons was that different readers of a specification can
place different meanings on the same words, and, for
example, the sequencing of the lamps relating to
engagement and system test on the Repeater Panel needed
to be revised. The reference to system test in Increment 6
is indicative of the difficulties encountered in specit3"ing a
comprehensive test. The contribution from Increment 4
was not sufficient and more work had to be included in the
final increment.
During the development of the simulation no fundamental
flaw or omission has been discovered in the written
specification. Nevertheless, a wealth of additional detail
has been accumulated mainly to reinforce inadequate
descriptions or to compensate for minor omissions. The
most significant inadequacy was the omission of a
description about how to apply the consolidation algorithm
of Reference 17 to replicated units in a fault tolerant
manner (additional voting was included).
hnplementation of the Simulation
Ada was selected as the implementation language; its
selection was determined by a number of considerations.
First, Ada is a US DoD mandated language, and _ as also
"highly recommended" by the UK MOD, which has
resulted in a number of very high quality compilers being
available. In addition, packages and tasks are language
features which have been very important in implementing
the system. Finally, the code generation tool Adacode,
described below, was already available in prototype form to
serve as a basis for the project.
Complexity Overview
The question of complexity has been ",addressed from _veral
viewpoints. The JSD meth_xt incor_rates in its mtxtelling
phase a powerful technique for grasping the fundamentals
of system development and provides a solid platform for
subsequent work. On its own, however, it is not sufficient
for resolving the complexity of a diverse system which has
inbuilt redundancies, it is necessary, to introduce additional
features, JSD units and connections, to reduce the
complexity of whole system to a manageable size. These
conceptual advances arc of little practical use without
asstx:iatcd support from CASE tools. A database must be
able to accept and manipulate the unit definitions, and c_?dc
generation t_ls must be able to access this information in
order to build the final system. The whole JSD-unit based
approach gives rise to a management of the compiexit) of
the system to the extent that it may be considered tamed.
The verification which is embedded in the various stages of
the development of the specification, and its resultant
validation through operation of the simulation ensure that
any rogue aspects of the specification have been
eliminated.
At the heart of this complex specification, the detailed
requirement for the control law element was left blank; for
initial clearance this would be a unity transfer function
followed by a digital representation of the Lynx analogue
" _1 I I
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Fig 13 The Four Phases in a
AFCS. But the experimental control laws were the raison
d'etre for the ACT Lynx project, and needed a different
appr(_ch to their development.
Control Law/Concept Evaluation - Envelope
Expansion
Recognising that immaturity would be a normal part of the
development of ACT Lynx laws, a Control Law Life Cycle
Mc_el and associated working practices and pr(x:edures were
developed at DRA to ensure a di_iplined path to full
control law validation (Ref 18, 19). The development
cycle was formali_d to ensure that when control laws were
ultimately exercised in _l'ety critical areas, there would be
no possibility t)l them failing. Thus, along with the
hardware redundancy, the system would have a truly
comprehensive fail-operate capability'. The cycle comprises
four phases (Fig 13);
i) The Conceptual Phase (CP) evaluates basic concepts in a
form that can capture the operational requirements. It
includes simple mtxlelling, design and analysis activities
and pilot-in-the-h_)p simulation. Outputs from this phase
include knowledge of the response types and system
characteristics required to achieve the various Levels of
fl)ing quality.
ii) The Engineering Design Phase (EDP) takes results from
the CP and involves full control law design with a
representative vehicle model and includes refinements to
control system architectures via detailed mtx.lclling and
extensive pth_tcd simulation.
Control Law Life Cycle
iii) The Flight Clearance Phase (FCP) consolidates results
from earlier stages and achieves a verified implemcntation
for the target flight control computer. Validation of the
design, including a loads and stability anal}sis, i,_ a ke3
activity in the Clearance phase. The techniques of 'Inverse
Simulation' (Ref 20), with prescribed MTEs, oMcr a
convenient and efficient method lk_r exercising the control
law in a wide range range of repre_ntativc conditions prior
to flight.
iv) The Flight Test Phase (FrP) evaluates the control
system in full scale flight and appropriate operational
MTF_,s. Experiments in this phase will be 'replicas' ,d tcsts
conducted in ground-based simulation and changes to
control laws would cover only those regimes mapped t,ut
in the Conceptual and Engineering Design phase'; An
incremental approach to safety critical, high risk. Might
conditions would be normal practice.
The phascs are sequential but also iterative, ackno_ Icdgmg
that growth in knowledge can lead to a change ,n the
requirement or criteria format, often the objccti_c :ff the
research itself. At all stages, the discover3 _1 a Fault.
design error or uncertainty will generally require the return
to a previous phase. Special care needs to be takcn _ hen
'imposing' a proccdural discipline on research, that
crcati,,ity is not inhibited, but the di._iplinc nccds t_, cut
cvcn deeper with well defined working practiccs and
activities, if it is to have any real meaning as a safeguard
against errors or faults being designed in. Fig 14, taken
from RcI 18, illustrates a process structure diagram for the
CP with the three pnncipal tasks - pmblcm cxprcssion,
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Fig 14 Structure Diagram for the Conceptual Phase
design and review. The JSD notation is again used, ie
sequence, iteration (*) and _lecti0n (o), with the activities
corresponding to the lowest level 'leaves' on each branch.
Typically, de_umentafic_n i_ required a_ each new piece of
knowledge is accumulated and this is rellected in the right HCln
hand le',ff of the branches, a
0 • Low Aggression]
A • Mod _1 Series fro)
o • High H _ Serics 2 (e)
Conceptual Phase
Examples of research in the Conceptual Phase can be found
in References 21, 22 and 23. The archetypal DRA
conceptual simulation m(x.tel (CSM) was developed in
Reference 21, which reported comparative results with
different response types and autopilot m(xtes. In Reference
22, the first conceptual results from the DRA/Westland
research into carefree handling systems were published,
indicating the significant benefits of direct intervention
control laws. More recently, the first helicopter trials on
the DRA 'Large Motion Simulator rel:x_rled the achievement
of Level 1 handling qualities Ibr rate response types (Ref
_). Fig 15 shows one set of results from Reference 23,
with piiot+ handling:qua]it_ ratings plotted against roll
attitude bandwidth for a slalom task. The wide spread of
ratings with each Configuration illustrate the change in
perceived handling as pert2_rmance is increased, the I:xx_rest
ratings generally corresl:x_nding to the highest levels of
pilot aggressiveness.
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Fig 15 HQRs for Slalom MTE Flown With
DRA Conceptual Simulation Model
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The ADS33C Level 1/2 band'a'idth boundary for non-
tracking tasks is 2 rad/s, corresponding with the lowest
level of aggressiveness flown in the AFS trials. The
degradation at higher performance levels is consistent with
flight results (Ref 2), but pilots tend to be more senstitive
to task cues and critical of simulator deficiencies as
aggressiveness increases. Flying at large attitude angles
near the ground is particularly demanding on the fideliLv of
the simulated visual cues; the limited vertical field of view
and texture on the current AFS visual system must be a
major factor in the inability to achieve Level 1 at high
performance. This deficiency, along with modelling
uncertainties, common to all ground-based simulators, is,
of course, a primary" reason for the vigorous pursuit of high
performance in-flight simulators.
Engineering Design Phase
This phase consists of mapping the required characteristics
from the CP onto the.simulated target aircraft. As in the
CP, problem expression, design and review cover activities
in the Engineering Design pha_. However, the level of
detml will be considerably greater, including environmental
constraints and robustness critena. Internal control system
loop performance requirements and stability of uncontrolled
airframe modes will form parts of the problem expression.
The design sub-phase contains the modelling and
evaluation activities, as in the CP, but also includes
significant new activities under the synthesis label (Ref
18). The desired flying qualities requirements, cmtxxlied in
handling and ride quality functions, will be cast in
functional form and the as_ciated 'error' cost functions
minimised with respect to control system gains and filter
frequencies_ This is the essence of the synthesis at the
centre of control law design and a number of different
techniques are available for working the optimisation,
involving craft-like skills and trading pertormance and
robustness to achieve the best controller. Examples of
results from the Engineering Design phase are reported in
Refs 24, 25 and 26.
Clearance and Flight Test Phases
Activities within this phase have not been well developed
at DRA for the helicopter application. The clearance
activities will include software verification and a degree of
validation using more comprehensive models than in earlier
'real-time' evaluations, with the control law now embedded
in the target hardware. Flight tests represent the ultimate
rcscarch evaluation, although ironically, here there is little
scope l\_r design innovation and creativity. Flight test is
essentially a knowledge gathering exercise, but there is
considerable scope for innovation in experimental design.
A procedure sequence in the evaluation of a control law
might take the form;
i) engage ACT system when in required flight condition,
ii) build up task complexity and aggressiveness
incrementally
ORIGINAL PA_£ IS
OF POOR QUALITY
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iii) curtain function cleared l-or minimum flight envelope
initially (low aggressiveness)
iv) open curtain incrementally as aggressiveness increa_d
v) test control law at safe altitude initially with
representative task gain ( eg using helmet displa))
vi) test control law at low altitude with representative
natural task cues
Throughout this process, regular reviews of the documented
results with results from previous phases will be required.
A fully developed control law, enabling Level 1 flying
qualities at high agility levels, should never experience a
software 'failure'. Hardware failures will be protected
against to a high reliability through redundancy.
Inadvertent excursions beyond flight envelope limits will
be protected against with built-in carefree handling
functions, working as an integral part of the control law.
Conclusions and Recommendations
With the aim of developing a high performance ACT
research helicopter, the DRA has developed the ACT Lynx
concept; ftx:us has been on research at high agility levels to
explore carefree handling concepts and the expansion of the
helicopter's usable flight envelope. The inherent high
agility of the Lynx, with its hingeless rotor, makes it an
excellent airframe Ior establishing requirements for future
types. This paper has reviewed this project from the
standpoint of the conflict between _fety and performance;
we can see a way through but a number of concurrent
s',ffety nets need to.be combined.
1) A highly skilled and motivated safety pilot with
backdriven conventional controls is the most important
safety net; exploratory simulation studies conducted at
DRA have focussed on recoveries to common mode
hardover failures. The results have highlighted recovery
times generally consistent with past flight experience
although torque, rotorspeed and 'g' limits can easily be
cxc_dcd.
2) System redundancy providing a fail-operate/fail-safe
capability provides the strongest and most effective safety
net against hardware failures.
3) A comprehensive requirement specification developed
through simulation ensures that the integrated system is
well underst¢×x.l and all functions and their operations arc
fully defined; this approach ensures that the Tixed' _ftware
is coherent and fully validated, hence providing the most
effective protection against common mode software
failures.
4) Control laws developed within the framework of an
itcrative life-cycle, including grc, und based simulation,
ensures protection against software emirs during the carl)'
development stages of this critical clement of the system.
The four phases - conceptual, cnginccnng, clearance and
flight - have been briclly dc,_ribcd.
5)Curtain functions, limiting the actuator drive signals,
can also bc used to protect against immaturity in the
control laws and can be opened incrementally to allow
more agility to be exploited,
6) A committment to carefree handling functions embedded
within the control laws is considered to be an essential
ingredient to ACT research if full agility is to be realised.
Ultimately, together with the safety pilot and FOFS
hardware, this should complete the triad of safety nets
necessary Ior the synergy of performance and ,'safety.
At the time of writing, the U-K programme is at a hiaitus
duc to funding limitations. In this paper the authors have
attempted to provide a candid exposure of some of the
issues sorrounding the safety/perlk_rmance conflict, to
stimulate a continuing debate with collatx)rative partners
pursuing similar goals. It is believed that flight research at
high agility levels will only be possible, with acceptable
risk, if these issues are squarely faccd.
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